Executive Type and Trade Protection in the 1990’s: Where’s the Pork?
Nathan K. Mitchell, Eric A Booth, Billy Monroe

Throughout the 1990’s the level of trade protection have decreased across most nations and this trend has continued to this day, however many nations remain more protectionist than others. Extending work done in the United States crossnationally, this study seeks to discern what institutional arrangements lead to higher levels of protection. By looking at macroeconomic and political institutions data from 1990 to 2000, this study develops a model of trade protection that suggests that presidential systems are overall less protectionist than parliamentary systems. The 1990’s are an important time period to study because this was the start of the rapid era of globalization and right before the financial problems associated with the later part of the 2000’s. The data show that parliamentary systems have higher tariff rates than other systems, but this is contingent on the type of electoral system. This study also finds evidence that strong executives with lots of policy tools are able to circumvent the legislature to provide “pork” on their own.

Full Text: PDF     DOI: 10.15640/jirfp.v2n3-4a1