

Relations Between the Eu and Turkey after 2016 Turkish Coup D'état Attempt

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Abstract

On July 15th, 2016 the coup attempt that was started by some rebellious soldiers of the Turkish Armed Forces resulted in failure. The state of emergency that was announced after the failed coup attempt led to widescale purges and arrests. Due to rising doubts over a fair trial the reputation of Turkey regarding human rights and democracy was damaged. On April 16th, 2017, Turkey passed an executive presidential system and destroyed the principle of the separation of power. In this context, the European Parliament's decision to freeze accession talks with Turkey carried on relations between the EU and Turkey the agenda again. In this study, relations between the EU and Turkey will be explored with recent problems and considerations of internal and external factors including an analysis of barriers in front of the EU integration of Turkey.

Keywords: Relations Between the EU and Turkey, 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, 2017 Turkish Constitutional Referendum

1. Introduction

On July 15th, 2016 rogue or rebellious soldiers of the Turkish armed forces tried to overthrow the elected government AKP (Justice and Development Party) and wanted to eliminate the elected President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with a coup attempt. Some of the coup plotters had links with the Gülenist movement (House of Commons, 2017: 36) but, according to claims of the Turkey, Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETÖ) or Parallel State Structure (PSS) it was the terrorist organization and its leader Fethullah Gülen, a US based Muslim cleric who organized this coup attempt. After these events the Turkish authorities proclaimed a state of emergency to sweep members of terrorist organization on July 20th, 2016 and extended this seven times. However, the Turkish authorities increased their crackdown over not only perpetrators of the coup attempt itself, but also dissidents, the media, journalists, secularists, opposition MPs and human rights activists (Shaheen, K., 2017). In addition to this, after the constitutional referendum was held on April 16th, 2017, the Turkish president used sweeping new powers and Turkey passed the executive presidency despite disputes over ballots (Topping, A., Shaheen, K., & Smith, H., 2017). This situation disturbed relations between the EU and Turkey within the context of the accession process of Turkey. This was especially the case in the European Parliament's report and decisions showed that because of lack of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law a temporary freeze on the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey should be applied (Piri, K., 2017: 4).

Under these conditions, since 1959, fragile relations between the EU and Turkey have never stabilised between mutual accusations and dependencies. Particularly, authoritarian tendencies in Turkey and instability in the European zone due to economic crisis, Brexit and rising populism are rendering unclear the integration process. Moreover, disagreements over the solution of the Syrian refugee crisis and the paradox of the EU and Turkey migrant deal means the accession process is stuck and leads to a vicious circle. In this period, contrary approaches and policies between The EU and Turkey should be questioned: Is Turkey losing its democratic structure with the axis shifting policies of the ruling party AKP? Is the EU ambivalent towards Turkey because of shortcomings of its democratic, secular system of Turkey or Islamophobia? Within the context of common interests, can Turkey and the EU meet in some points?

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To ensure a stable, long-lasting, sustainable process, what should the EU and Turkey give as concessions? Should Turkey become a privileged member of the EU or, in the near future, will Turkey still stand in the periphery of the EU without membership?

In the framework of these questions, the last issues are the migration deal, the accession process, effects of the coup attempt, human rights violations in the state of emergency, extradition of the coup plotters and the approach of Europe, the changing structure of Turkey in the AKP era and its effects on ties with the EU, legitimacy of the national referendum of Turkey, modernisation of the Customs Union and the reunification of Cyprus will be analysed to create an effective, dynamic and mutually satisfactory situation. In addition to this, results of Brexit and alternative cooperation seeking in Turkey as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union will be evaluated within the context of euroscepticism increased in the society. Also levels of attractiveness of the EU will be presented: Is the EU losing its dominance in the world economic order or is it a transformation period in the globalization age?

Furthermore, some claims about a lack of understanding, hypocrisy of the EU and interferences of the EU to Turkish domestic affairs will be discussed in an objective way. Differences between state realities and discourses of political actors in the press release and rallies will be observed and chauvinism and demagoguery will be shown.

2. The Turkish Coup Attempt And Its Repercussion In The EU

According to Naomi Klein (Klein, 2017) "The term of shock doctrine describes the quite brutal tactic of systematically using the public's disorientation following a collective shock – wars, coups, terrorist attacks, market crashes or natural disasters – to push through radical pro-corporate measures, often called "shock therapy". Within the context of this doctrine, the effect of the collapse of neoliberalism and rising protectionist policies over nation-state countries is to create chaos to abuse social cohesion. Moreover, this method can direct and manipulate with extremist political ideologies to take radical decisions. In this process, ideologic tools of the governments are media organisations and work as the yellow press that wants to create more sales with exaggerations of news, scandal-mongering or sensationalism (Campbell, W. J., 2001).

Before the coup attempt, Turkey was in political and economical instability. The Syrian civil war and its reflection in Turkey can be seen in the number of Syrians under the temporary protection of Turkey which was 2,884,441 in 2016 (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate general of migration management, 2017). The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that is a radical Islamist terrorist organisation based on Syria and Iraq, TAK and PKK which are Kurdish separatist terrorist organisations with its jihadists, members and sympathizers have carried out a series of bomb attacks within a year.

Table 1. shows before the failed coup attempt, terrorist organisations that are ISIL, PKK and TAK carried out bomb attacks in different cities of Turkey and a lot of people were killed or wounded.

Table1. Bomb Attacks in Turkey in 2016

| Date | District | Responsible | Damage |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|--|
| January 12 th , 2016 | Istanbul's Sultanahmet District | ISIL | 13 German tourists were killed and 14 people were wounded. |
| January 14 th , 2016 | Diyarbakir, Cinar | PKK | 6 people were killed and 39 people were wounded. |
| February 17 th , 2016 | Ankara | TAK | 29 people were killed and 39 people were wounded. |
| March 13 th , 2016 | Ankara, Kizilay | PKK | 37 people were killed and 71 people were wounded. |
| March 19 th , 2016 | Istanbul's Istiklal Street | ISIL | 5 people were killed and 37 people were wounded. |
| March 31 st , 2016 | Diyarbakir | PKK | 7 police were killed and 27 people were wounded including 13 police. |
| April 27 th , 2016 | Bursa, Grand Mosque | TAK | 1 person was killed and 13 people were wounded. |
| May 1 st , 2016 | Gaziantep | ISIL | 2 police were killed and 23 people were wounded. |
| May 10 th , 2016 | Diyarbakir | PKK | 3 PKK suspects were killed and 45 people were injured. |
| May 12 th , 2016 | Diyarbakir | PKK | 16 people were killed and 23 people were wounded. |
| June 7 th , 2016 | İstanbul, Vezneciler | TAK | 11 people were killed including 6 police and 36 people were wounded. |
| June 8 th , 2016 | Mardin, Midyat | PKK | 4 people were killed including 2 police and 34 people were wounded. |
| June 28 th , 2016 | İstanbul, Atatürk Airport | ISIL | 45 people were killed and 239 people were wounded. |

Source: <http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/12/timeline-of-terrorism-in-turkey>

After these shocking events, on July 15th, 2016 a rebellion group within the Turkish armed forces tried to take over control of the country. According to claims of the Chief of Staff, General Hulusi Akar, he was taken hostage. Bosphorous Bridge was blockaded by tanks and soldiers, The Turkish Grand Assembly was bombarded, Turkish State Television (TRT) was seized by putschists and a declaration about the takeover of the country was made by The Peace at Home Council that is a so-called executive body of coup management. At that time, President Erdoğan survived the attack by the assassin group and he connected CNN Türk Broadcast, the Turkish news channel and invited Turkish citizens to resist this coup attempt with Facetime application. Consequently “240 citizens lost their lives and 1535 were wounded as a result of clashes with the army” (Foundation, E. D., 2016).

Klein (Klein, 2017) continues in the term of shock doctrine that “A large-scale crisis – whether a terrorist attack or a financial crash – would likely provide the pretext to declare some sort of state of exception or emergency, where the usual rules no longer apply.” Especially, after the coup attempt on July 20th, 2016 the scope of executive orders of the state of emergency extended over, not only limited with coup plotters and alleged links to the Gülenists but also opposition groups against the ruling party AKP. Large scale purges, detainees, arrests showed that the Turkish judiciary system became a part of the AKP and lost its independence. More than 150,000 people have faced legal action and 50,000 – including academics, journalists, rights activists and opposition MPs have been jailed (Cagaptay, S., 2017).

Table 2. shows that after the failed coup attempt, Turkey widens the scale of purges.

Table 2. Post-coup Actions

| | |
|---|---------|
| State Official, Teachers, Bureacrats And Academics Got Sacked | 138,148 |
| Detained | 118,235 |
| Arrested | 55,927 |
| Schools, Dormitories And Universities Shut Down | 2,099 |
| Academics Lost Jobs | 8,271 |
| Judges, Prosecutors Dismissed | 4,424 |
| Media Outlets Shut Down | 149 |
| Journalists Arrested | 269 |

Source: <https://turkeypurge.com/>

President Erdoğan described the coup attempt as a “gift from God” in the early days of the coup (Gotev, G., 2016). This was a significant moment because it became a sign what would happen after the coup. A secret report written by Intcen, the intelligence service of the EU, claimed that, before the failed coup attempt, President Erdogan was planning a purge in the armed forces of suspected dissidents in his government. The report of August 2016 continues that, “The decision to launch the coup resulted from the fears of an incoming purge.

It is likely that a group of officers comprising Gulenists, Kemalists (secularists), opponents of the AKP and opportunists was behind the coup. It is unlikely that Gulen himself played a role in the attempt.” (Waterfield, B. B., 2017). The political ambition of the AKP was to seize the state with obedient members of its cadres. Historically, with the so-called Ergenekon trials and Sledgehammer cases, positions of Turkish armed forces were wiped out from Kemalists which is a founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey and feeds from secularism. In this way, with fabricated evidences in 2012 and 2013 cases, Gülenists placed its members to rule institutions of the state like a virus and its old alliance AKP increased its influence and immunity of the state control mechanisms like judiciary, bureaucracy and the military (in Turkey) collapsed. The separation process between the AKP and Gülenist started in the 2013 corruption scandal. The AKP began to eliminate Gülenist members who leaked tapes and documents regarding corruption. Their positions were filled or appointed via the Turkish patronage system of *kadrolasma* (Jacinto, L., 2017) or nepotism. Specifically a Eurasianist clique who is aiming to establish good relations with neighbour countries and Russia is becoming more dominant than Atlanticists who believe Turkey’s strategic interests lie in its U.S. and NATO ties (Jacinto, L., 2017). Also, a polarization of direction or axis shift of Turkey can be observed.

The reconstruction of the AKP in the state led to the erosion of confidence in justice. The last survey was produced by SONAR (C. 2017) and found that the rate of confidence decreased to 40% amongst Turkish society. In addition to this, Turkey ranked 99 out of 113 countries on the Rule of Law (World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, 2016). This approach indicates that Turkey is under threat from the party state. A climate of paranoia and fear is sovereign that there is no criticism to the decisions of government and president Erdoğan. A witch-hunt is executed by the government with bizarre conspiracy theories according to a chorus of critics (Arango, T., Yeginsu, C., & Timur, S., 2016).

While Turkey struggled with the coup attempt and its aftermath the EU was pulling a poker face. Firstly, a statement by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the EU High Representative on behalf of the EU Member States was presented at the ASEM Summit on the situation in Turkey (European Council, 2016): It said, “Turkey is a key partner for the European Union. The EU fully supports the democratically elected government, the institutions of the country and the rule of law. We call for a swift return to Turkey’s constitutional order. We continue to follow closely the developments and to coordinate with the 28 EU Member States.”

The President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, condemned the coup attempt. He emphasized democratic rule, freedom of speech and the respect of fundamental rights, Rule of Law and the complete separation of powers on July 16th, 2016 (European Parliament, The President, 2016): “The attempted coup yesterday evening in Turkey is shocking and I condemn it in the strongest terms... Return to the rule of law, complete separation of powers and the full respect of fundamental rights are expected immediately.” After these condemnations, the EU criticized the state institutions of Turkey for cleansing from Gülenists, secularist and dissidents.

As a result of rising populism and authoritarianism in Turkey, Erdogan's party transformed from a central, catch-all party to a conservative party that flirted with radical Islamism and fascism. The debate concerning the reinstatement of the death penalty began in Turkey because of the discourses of Erdogan in rallies to satisfy its fanatics. Different voices from the EU have cautioned political forces of Turkey with statements like Federica Mogherini's, a High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: "No country can become a EU member-state if it introduces death penalty. That's very clear in our *acquis*." ('Remarks by the High-Representative,' 2016) After that, The EU Foreign Affairs Council condemned the coup and expressing solidarity with the the EU with the Turkish citizens on July 18th, 2016. In addition to this, the EU underlined European values and recalled that the unequivocal rejection of the death penalty is an essential element of the Union *acquis* ('Council conclusions on Turkey,' 2016).

After the declaration of the State of Emergency, the EU expressed that, "This declaration comes in the wake of the recent unacceptable decisions on the education system, judiciary and the media. As outlined in the conclusions of the Council and in the discussion of the European Commission this week, we call on Turkish authorities to respect under any circumstances the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right of all individuals concerned to a fair trial." ('Statement by High Representative,' 2016). At the same time, some statements about disappointments of Turkish political actors in lack of solidarity of the EU was released by the Minister for EU Affairs and the Chief Negotiator, Ömer Çelik said that "No European official came to Turkey in the wake the failed coup attempt to show solidarity with our President or PM save UK Europe Minister. If it were the migration issue, they would have visited Ankara in a row in a couple days.

Sorry to see that they failed in the democracy test. Statements with a single sentence to condemn coup attempt and questioning our democratic credentials in length only serve to the coup plotters." ('Minister for EU Affairs,' 2016).

On November 24th, 2016, members of the European Parliament called for a temporary freeze on EU accession talks with Turkey. The procedure for suspending EU accession negotiations is set out in article 5 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey. This stipulates that, "in the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption" ('Freeze EU accession talks,' 2016). After that, President Erdogan threatened the EU with "I will open the gates for a new wave of migrants to enter Europe if the EU blocks membership talks." (Mortimer, C. ,2016).

In the shadow of these statements, while The EU was drawing its redlines such as capital punishment, fair trial, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms, Turkey was using its trump cards. One of the most decisive of these for Turkey was the migration flows from the Egean Sea and the completion of the set conditions of The EU-Turkey refugee deal. With this deal, EU Member States will increase the resettlement of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish nationals and provide financial support for Turkey's refugee population. However, after the rising tension between the EU and Turkey, the deal was postponed because of mutual mistrust. Secondly is the potential compromise with Russia. Traditionally, unchangeable approaches in Turkish diplomacy dictates that in the case of insufficient support of the west, the country pursues a balance of power theory and seeks new alliances. In the multipolar world, Turkey's government wants to become stronger and more powerful. In the eyes of decision makers of the AKP, politically and economically, cooperation with Russia and China is more attractive than with the EU. In this regard, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could be an alternative haven for Turkey but NATO membership, dependency of US, historical links with European countries does not allow this axis shift.

Under the hegemony of Erdoganism in Turkey, vagarity in world order and deviation from European values, Turkey's direction is unpredictable where western ideologies are refused due to religious based dogmas. To the first legal step of their ambitions Turkey held the constitutional referendum in 2017.

3. 2017 Turkish Referendum: Turkish Polarization and Authoritarianism in the Contest Of Populism in the Eu

On April 16th, 2017, Turkey held a constitutional referendum to expand the power of presidency with an executive presidential system or 'alla turca presidential system' under the declared state of emergency. These are numerical changes; ("Why did Turkey hold a referendum?," 2017)

1. The role of prime minister will be scrapped. The new post of vice president, possibly two or three, will be created.
2. The president becomes the head of the executive, as well as the head of state, and retains ties to a political party.
3. He or she will be given sweeping new powers to appoint ministers, prepare the budget, choose the majority of senior judges and enact certain laws by decree.
4. The president alone will be able to announce a state of emergency and dismiss parliament.
5. Parliament will lose its right to scrutinise ministers or propose an enquiry. However, it will be able to begin impeachment proceedings or investigate the president with a majority vote by MPs. Putting the president on trial would require a two-thirds majority.
6. The number of MPs will increase from 550 to 600.
7. Presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the same day every five years. The president will be limited to two terms.

These expanded authorities of the president have the potential to institutionalize a one-man state regime and interfere with legislative and judicial independence. Parliament lost its power. Moreover, the safety of the check and balance mechanism was destroyed. Principles of separation of power was eliminated in this way and a limping democratic state system of Turkey was transferred from Turkish citizens to the individual.

After the coup attempt, the state of emergency yielded wide-scale pressure over Turkish citizens. In addition to this, the government created a climate of fear and launched witch-hunts with purges, detainees and arrests. Supporters of non-campaigning were labelled repeatedly, like terrorists or coup-plotters by several AKP members, including Cabinet ministers and the Prime Minister. Erdogan told the press, "April 16 will be the answer to July 15, the day of the coup attempt... Those who say no will be siding with July 15." ("In run-up to referendum," 2017).

Despite intimidation over no-campaigning in the media, and fraud at the ballot-boxes with illegal ballots, the referendum resulted in neck and neck. The 'yes' vote had about 51.41% compared with 48.59% for the 'no' vote.

According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) the voting day was "well administered" but it also criticised the referendum campaign (OSCE, 2017):

- It was an "unlevel playing field" and the two sides of the campaign "did not have equal opportunities"
- It was unbalanced due to the active involvement of the president and several senior officials
- It was tarnished by a number of officials equating No supporters with terrorist sympathisers
- State resources were misused
- Under the state of emergency, essential fundamental freedoms were curtailed
- Despite some measures, the legal framework remained inadequate for a genuinely democratic referendum.

The Council of Europe which also monitored the poll said the vote "did not live up" to its standards. The monitors also criticised a late change by electoral officials that allowed voting papers without official stamps to be counted. However, the head of Turkey's electoral body said a similar procedure had been used in past elections.

After these events, The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted to reinstate monitoring procedures of Turkey in Strasbourg on April 24th, 2017 (Rankin, J., 2017).

On July 6th, 2017, The Parliament voted in favour of the 2016 Commission Report on Turkey, suggesting the suspension of accession talks, with 477 voting in favour and 64 voting against. Almost 100 lawmakers abstained from the vote, which was non-binding. "MEPs are calling for a freeze on accession talks because since the failed military coup in July 2016, tens of thousands of people, including military personnel, public servants, teachers and university deans, prosecutors, journalists and opposition politicians, have been fired, suspended, detained or arrested. MEPs are concerned about the crackdown and the threat by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to reintroduce the death penalty." ("EU-Turkey relations," 2016). Nevertheless, the EU kept the door open with dialogue meetings on May 25th 2017 between president Erdogan, the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and European Council President Donald Tusk on June 13th and July 25th, 2017 between Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, EU Minister Ömer Çelik, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn to improve cooperation in energy, trade and counter-terrorism areas ("Turkey, EU to hold political dialogue", 2017).

The fragile relationship between the EU and Turkey is concerning, with Government policy makers and Erdogan's attitude towards the EU and western ideology placed within the context of human rights, democracy, freedom of speech, universal rights and solidarity. Perceptions of Turkish society in the so-called democratic election were abused with the shocking coup attempt.

Pressure on the opposition group caused deep polarization in society and the political ambitions of Erdogan over the fate of Turkey with his Islamic ideas following reconstruction of the state under the project of a new Turkey. This deconstruction is crushing innocent people, accused like terrorists; a political judgement of Turkey because of different thoughts from those of the government.

However, political confusion in Turkey is a reflection of rising populism, xenophobia, fascism and its ideological tools of politically right parties' appearances in the political arena of the EU. Turkey is only one example of the international conjuncture. The AKP is challenging with republican values, democracy and secularism to strengthen its position and continue the status quo. Anti-democratic, authoritarian policies of Turkey should be evaluated with the same thoroughness in Europe, as results of Brexit created a domino effect in Europe and far right parties supplied votes with their blood smelling ideologies to exploit electors.

4. Results

Erdogan is a demagog and he is a product of the political mutation that occurred as a most unusual and dangerous shape against his mainstream predecessors. He was like an antidote of instability amid the collective submission and hopelessness about the future of the state. After that, Turkish society sacrificed its rights to reach welfare. However, over time, Erdogan was caught by the effect of the poison of power in a so-called representative democracy while he was denying national will.

Turkey is now experiencing fantastic dystopian days. The authoritarian tendencies of the government and president Erdogan are creating continuing political conflict. Due to the historical hatred towards opposition ideas, Erdogan is executing vengeful policies to reinforce his followers.

Firstly, he broke the existing bureaucratic tutelage regime of the Kemalists with the Gülenists in the so-called Ergenekon trials and Sledgehammer cases and appointed members of the Gülen movement. However, in the share of the absolute power, Erdogan confessed his sins in the coup attempt and proclaimed Gülenists as a scapegoat. The Gülenists were accused of being a parallel state structure but without the support of the ruling party and Erdogan, Gülenists could not spread and gain power in the state.

The coup attempt on July 15th, 2016 was a breaking point in the constitutional, democratic, secular, republican state of Turkey. In the new Turkey, instead rule of law and independence of the judiciary; arbitrary rules that depends on Erdogan's decisions are being implemented by the justice keepers. Instead of meritocracy, equality, non-discrimination and fairness; obedience to Erdogan and membership of AKP is sufficient to enter state cadres. Instead of freedom of speech and press, fictions of the pro-government media organisations work not only in the interest of their own companies but also to survival of the AKP. Instead of secularism and respect for minorities, rising privileges of Muslim and Islamisation are more crucial. Instead of scientific education with rationalism and humanism, religious dogmas and heroism are the new features of the Turkish national education system. Instead of human rights; torture, prohibition, threats, legitimization of violence are the new reality of Turkey. Instead of interest based relations in international area; Turkey is losing its prestige in the rising tension with not only European countries like the 2017 Dutch-Turkish diplomatic incident and disturbing ties between Germany and Turkey because of the arrests of human defenders but also the US on the US pastor Andrew Brunson's arrest.

Fundamental rights of people are being destroyed by the AKP with the confidence of half of the electors. The election promises of the AKP are always based on political and economical stability but since 2002, Turkey has been struggling with an economic crisis of corruption and different types of terrorism. In addition to this, alleged coup plotters and people who are labelled as terrorists without fair trial, are being detained or arrested. The AKP is taking advantage of the state of emergency. Dissidents, including academics, journalists, human right activists and opposition MPs are being purged without any explanation. With these actions, Turkey became the biggest jail for journalists in the world and, according to The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, the country was at the level of hybrid regimes like Ukraine, Bolivia, Tanzania and Mali in 2016 (The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, 2017).

After the Turkish constitutional referendum on April 16th, 2017, Turkey institutionalized an anti-democratic state structure under the authoritarian regime. With the executive presidential system, the principle of separation of power collapsed. In this way, Turkey exited from liberal democracy or being a Western type nation-state and passed illiberal democracy.

As a result of this referendum and major crackdown on human rights after the coup attempt; relations between Turkey and the EU remain full of problematic and pessimistic areas. Different kinds of threats, non diplomatic languages, conflict based relations lead to a carrot and stick approach and therefore sides have adopted more aggressive methods. The ideological background of the AKP and its effect on the structure of Turkey, legitimacy suspicions surrounding the elections of Turkey, modernisation of the Customs Union, the Armenian Genocide issue and reunification of Cyprus are contradictions within the EU.

Nevertheless, supremacy of the US is being taken over by a multipolar world order and the EU will become one of the more effective actors if it can complete its integration process. If Turkey is a part of this integration process and it can fix its democracy without any concession, an alliance between the EU and Turkey can reach the expected level.

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